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THE LAWYER PRESENTS-On October 3, 1913, the income tax law of 1913 went into effect.
By employing a single word, "dividends," the Congress of the
United States covered the entire field of the taxation of corporate
distributions. What had begun, however, with the utmost in
simplicity has now developed into a very complex subject, as is
evidenced by a glance at the twenty-five sections which it now
occupies in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. One of the chief
criticisms of the present revenue provisions in regard to the
taxation of corporate distributions is the great amount of complexity which many attorneys consider entirely unnecessary.
The cry has arisen for a greater amount of simplicity - a return
to the plain words in the taxing act of 1913. In our first lead
article, The Law of Income Taxation and CorporateDistributions,
Herman T. Reiling, Assistant Chief Counsel of the Internal
Revenue Service, takes a scholarly look at the development of
this important area of income taxation. Tracing the history of the
successive statutory provisions down to the present code, Mr.
Reiling makes a careful analysis of each of the factors which
have been instrumental in the weaving of this intricate network.
Only by recognizing the foundations and reasons for the present
complex provisions, Mr. Reiing believes, is it possible to solve
the existing difficulties and inaugurate a greater amount of tax
simplification.
In 1953 an amendment to the United States Housing Act of 1937
was introduced into the House of Representatives by Congressman Ralph H. Gwinn of New York. The Gwinn Amendment
provided, in substance, that no tenant residing in a housing
development constructed with the aid of federal funds under
the Housing Act of 1937 shall be a member of an organization
designated as subversive by the United States Attorney General.
Pursuant to this amendment, tenants were required to sign
loyalty oaths containing the Attorney General's list of subversive
organizations. Objections to this loyalty requirement arose quickly
and from diverse quarters. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently held the loyalty oath as violative of constitutional rights and
certiorari was subsequently refused by the United States Supreme Court in Lawson v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee,
270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955).
California has taken a similar position and a petition for certiorari

is now pending in the Supreme Court. Housing Authority of
Los Angeles v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 890, 279 P.2d 215
(1955), petition for cert. filed, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 319 (U.S. Jan. 24,
1956) (No. 628). In Tenant's Loyalty Oaths, Henry N. Williams,
Associate Professor in the Walter F. George School of Law,
Mercer University, examines thoroughly the legislative history
of the Gwinn Amendment and the various questions which have
arisen and undoubtedly will arise under its applications. Professor
Williams has a number of unique observations, not only on constitutional issues raised, but on problems of statutory interpretation and policy considerations involved under the Gwinn Amendment.
In personam jurisdiction of state courts over non-resident defendants has continually presented perplexing problems in the
adjective development of the common law. In the United States,
the inherent complexity of this jurisdictional problem has been
intensified by the United States Constitution and its restrictions
upon state jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), announced the Constitution's limitation upon a state asserting
jurisdiction over a non-resident by requiring that personal service
be made upon the person within the state's boundaries. Justice
Holmes' definition of jurisdiction exemplifies the Pennoyer case
concept: "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power. .. ."
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). Though physical
power lay at the basis of jurisdiction, subtle doctrines such as
"implied consent," "presence in the state," and "doing business
within the state" were developed to give the state its needed
physical power. Finally, in InternationalShoe Co. v Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme Court set forth the "minimum
contact" rule as a basis for state in personam jurisdiction over
non-residents. State legislatures were ever alert in pressing to
its fullest perimeter the constitutional limitation on state jurisdiction: for example, by enacting statutes exerting jurisdiction
over non-resident motorists or over non-residents engaging in
dangerous activities within the state. But this was piecemeal
development. On January 1, 1956, the newly revised Illinois
Practice Act became effective. In section 17 of this act is incorporated, to its fullest extent, the in personam jurisdiction of
Illinois courts over non-residents. John M. O'Connor, Jr. and
James M. Goff, co-authors of the Lawyer's third lead article,
were both members of committees responsible for drafting the
new practice act. In this article, the authors explore past decisions
and existing state enactments that lend support to the expanded
concepts of state jurisdiction over non-residents.

